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Monday threat briefing: Ransomware crews eye edge device flaws, patch PAN-OS CVE-2024-3400 and ScreenConnect CVE-2024-1709

Marcus Webb ·

LockBit and Akira operators are prioritizing internet facing VPN and remote management systems on Monday mornings, focusing on known flaws in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS GlobalProtect CVE-2024-3400 and ConnectWise ScreenConnect CVE-2024-1709, along with weakly configured OpenSSH. The goal is rapid initial access in North America and Europe, followed by same day data theft and ESXi and Windows encryption.

This matters because working exploit code is widely available and scanning is automated, so the gap between exposure and compromise is short. Months after vendor fixes, a measurable population of unpatched devices remains reachable, which keeps these vectors profitable.

Edge devices remain soft targets PAN-OS CVE-2024-3400 enables unauthenticated command execution on GlobalProtect gateways. It has been used in the wild, including by the cluster tracked as UTA0218, to drop web shells and pivot inside networks. Palo Alto released fixed PAN-OS builds in April 2024, and systems that have not been upgraded and rekeyed remain at high risk.

ConnectWise ScreenConnect CVE-2024-1709 is an authentication bypass that grants admin access to on premises servers. It has been mass exploited to deploy ransomware and remote tooling. Defenders should update to a patched release, rotate API keys and reset server secrets, then review for unauthorized users and session anomalies.

OpenSSH exposure compounds the problem. The regreSSHion bug CVE-2024-6387 affected glibc based Linux distributions and became a staple in broad scanning. Even when patched, weak configurations and password based logins leave servers vulnerable to credential attacks that feed the same ransomware playbooks.

What defenders should do today Identify and patch exposed GlobalProtect, ScreenConnect, and OpenSSH immediately, or take them off the internet until fixed. After patching, rotate device certificates, local and service credentials, and API tokens, then hunt for persistence such as unfamiliar admin accounts, modified portal pages, web shells in gateway directories, and new scheduled tasks.

Audit for pre encryption staging. Look for Rclone, MEGAcmd, 7zip, or WinSCP use on servers, unexpected SSH or PowerShell remoting between subnets, and attempts to disable EDR or volume shadow copies. Restrict management access to known IP ranges, enforce MFA everywhere including on VPN and RMM, and require hardware backed MFA for privileged accounts.

Expect lateral movement to VMware ESXi. Review vCenter and host logs for unusual datastore access, snapshot deletions, and new accounts. Back up hypervisor configurations offline, verify restore paths, and test incident response runbooks that isolate management networks quickly.

The broader picture is unchanged. As long as edge services and admin tools stay exposed with lagging patches and permissive access, financially motivated crews will continue to convert low complexity exploits into reliable Monday morning revenue.